For two solid months, Russia pounded away at the town of Popasna. Again and again, Russian forces crossed the 2 miles from the neighboring town of Pervomaisk, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. Again and again the forces that survived to reach Popasna were pounded into scrap by artillery stationed west of the town. But gradually, after tremendous losses, Russia wore the defenders in Popasna down. They reduced the buildings in the east of the town to rubble. They reduced the buildings in the south and west of the town to rubble. They reduced the buildings in the north of the town to rubble. Finally, with not a single intact building remaining, Russia took Popasna. Sort of.
"The Russians are not just destroying Popasna,” said the head of the regional military administration. “They are removing it from the map.” Russian drone footage showed the last survivors of the town being blasted out of the rubble with grenades. On May 7, Russia celebrated their capture of a town that no longer existed.
Capturing Erasing Popasna seemed to be an accomplishment. Yes, it took Russian forces over two months to grind out 2 miles of progress despite piling onto Popasna more forces in less space than anywhere else along the entire line of battle. But they got it, by Putin, and then … they seemed to forget what came next.
As kos has detailed, Russia had initially aimed at carving a north-south line through Ukrainian territory far to the west, a line that would have started at the city of Kharkiv and cut all the way down to Zaporizhzhia. That didn’t work out. So Russia cut back its ambitions and instead started down a path that ran southwest from the salient they established at Izyum. Only that attempt ground to a halt, so they started going southeast instead, aiming to cut off a smaller but still substantial chunk that would include the cities of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. But okay then, who needs those cities? Instead, Russia could go from Lyman to the place that used to be Popasna on the map. That would be just a fraction of their original goal, but hey, it has Lyman. It contains Severodonetsk. It puts Russian troops on the other side of the Siverskyi Donets River and pretty much at the boundaries of Luhansk, so get busy with that.
Except that since Russia moved all those forces assaulting Popasna to sitting on the dust that had been Popasna, it seems to have lost track of what to do with them. In the last 10 days, Russia has attacked west out of Popasna. And north out of Popasna. And southwest out of Popasna. And south out of Popasna.
As of Thursday, the situation looked roughly like this: Russia has taken several small villages in the immediate vicinity of Popasna, most of which seemed to have been abandoned without resistance. But an attempt to drive west toward the town of Bakhmut was turned back at the village of Pylypchatyne. Attempts to drive back to the south ran into a wall at Troitske. The line of towns and villages north of of the “mini-salient” pushing out through Popasna has been under almost constant attack, but with the exception of Komyshuvakha, Ukraine seems to have held onto contested positions.
On Wednesday, the Russians made another run at Pylypchatyne and were repelled with heavy losses. Then they moved back inside their own lines, shifted troops from Popasna to the east, and made a run at Toshkivka. But they were thrown back again, and forces returned to sitting on the ashes of Popasna.
It’s not that Russian forces have made no progress since taking Popasna almost two weeks ago, but the loss of the town failed to turn into anything that might be described as a “breakthrough” that allowed Russian forces to flood through a gap in the Ukrainian line. Instead Popasna—a place with no standing shelter, water, or electricity—has become the new base for Russia’s slow crawl.
And without the direct goal of Popasna to capture, Russia seems uncertain of just where it wants to go next. It’s still attacking in directions that make no sense when applied to wider goals. The attempt to move west, which has failed at least twice when it reached Pylypchatyne, at least makes some sense in terms of trying to complete that connection to Lyman, which is only about 50 kilometers to the northwest. But Russia seems likely to abandon that effort, especially after the repeated failed attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets near Bilohorivka.
Eventually, Russian forces can be expected to go north from Popasna, not just because that’s the one direction where they’ve had some success, but because north from Popasna represents the smallest possible version of Russia’s “cut off Ukrainian forces at the eastern front” plan. If they can manage to keep their forces at Popasna relatively intact and pointing in the same direction, they might even make progress. Then pro-Russian sources can brag about how all those other attempts to cut off larger pieces of Ukraine were always feints. Very expensive feints.
But first expect Russia to make a few more pointless, high-casualty runs in random directions.
Thursday, May 19, 2022 · 3:20:32 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
The Russian shelling into border towns near Sumy over the last week has been a genuinely curious action. It’s hard to believe it would divert serious attention from other regions, because the odds of Russia launching an assault into these oblasts seems near zero.
On the other hand, it’s easy to see how it might lure artillery or aircraft the area in an effort to halt the shelling. Which could make a good trap … if Russia is thinking that far ahead.
Thursday, May 19, 2022 · 3:22:39 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
These are nasty weapons no matter which side is using them or how effective they might be. Mines in plastic casing can be extremely difficult to detect, making them a deadly hazard that can linger decades after the original conflict.
Thursday, May 19, 2022 · 4:01:12 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
New action east of Staryi Saltiv. On Wednesday, there absolutely nothing happening in the area according to the FIRMS data, and the social media chatter was so quiet that even some of the sources that had first reported Ukrainian forces crossing the Siverski Donets River began to suggest that the whole thing may have been more small united of Ukrainian special forces rather than a true bridgehead on the east.
But on Thursday, things are lighting up again.
On Tuesday, artillery fire was clustered near the village of Metalivka, north of the town of Zarichne, which had been reported captured by Ukraine, and about 5km north of the bridge at Staryi Saltiv. Now the fire has moved nearly 4km north to Buhaivka, right in the area where earlier information suggested Ukraine had created a pontoon bridge from Rubizhne.
Meanwhile. on the west side of the river, an earlier cluster of fire aimed at an area near the riverbank has moved to the west side of Rubizhne.
Is this Ukraine on the march again, resuming a pushing toward the rail junction at Vovchansk, and perhaps simultaneously moving against Russian forces still on the west side of the river? Or is it Russian forces coming down from Starytsya and Vovchansk to conduct a counter-counteroffensive against Ukrainian forces?
Honestly, I don’t know. However, there are some reports that Ukraine has now captured Buhaivka, securing both sides of the river at Rubiznhe. Take these with the normal shaker of salt, covered over by a extra heavy sauce of war fog.